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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗
“Any system of jurisprudence, if it is to be effective, must be given an opportunity

to grow and expand to meet changed conditions. The codification of principles is a
helpful means of simplification, but it must not be treated as adding rigidity where
resiliency is essential.”1

A.

Issues
It is the purpose of this memorandum to analyze the doctrines of command

responsibility and the responsibility of military officers for crimes committed by their
subordinates. Specifically, this paper argues that a military commander, acting as the de
facto policing authority in an occupied area can and should be held responsible not only
for the actions of his or her troops, but also for the actions of the civilians inhabiting his
or her area of control and for the actions of the state, which the military commander
represents. This should be especially true in an internal conflict, such as the conflict that
arose in Rwanda in 1994 where the distinctions between the military and the civilian
population were blurred. Through an extensive analysis of the doctrines of command
responsibility and superior responsibility, it will become apparent that such an extension
of command responsibility is justified by the jurisprudence in these fields.
The first part of this memorandum tracks the evolution of the doctrine of
command responsibility by assessing the major post-WWII cases dealing with the
doctrine, including In Re Yamashita, the High Command Case, and the Hostage Case.
∗

Issue 19: Research and analyze the extent to which a military officer is under a duty, pursuant to
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, to prevent massacres against
civilian population, either by other civilians or by the State.
1
United States v. Wilhelm List [hereinafter Hostage case], 1948, reprinted in Volume XI TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, at 1233 (United States Government Printing
Office 1950). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

1

The second part of this memorandum examines the extension of that doctrine to
civilian “superiors” by noting the modern codification of the doctrines of superior and
command responsibility in Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I and by examining
at length the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) in the Celbici case.
The third part of this memorandum will be a brief explanation of how the
notions of command responsibility and superior responsibility, codified for armed
conflicts of an international character, can be applied to internal conflicts such as the
1994 conflict in Rwanda. The fourth part of this memorandum will be an extensive
review of the modern jurisprudence dealing with superior responsibility generated by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). Finally, this memorandum will
provide an analysis of the sum of this case law.
In evaluating the evolution of the command responsibility doctrine through the
law established by post-WWII tribunals and the tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR, it will
be important to keep in mind what duties are defined as being part of a military
commander’s responsibility when occupying a territory and also which standard is being
applied to military commanders and superiors in order to establish their culpability.
B. Summary of Conclusions
It is the conclusion of this memorandum that military commanders can be, and
should be held responsible for war crimes committed by states or civilians within the
commander’s area of control if the commander knew or should have known that the
atrocities were committed or were going to be committed and the commander failed to
punish or to prevent these atrocities. This conclusion is consistent with post-WWII

2

jurisprudence regarding command responsibility, statutes governing the doctrine, and
modern jurisprudence concerning the doctrine generated by the ICTY and ICTR.
Furthermore, these principles apply to conflicts of an international character as well as to
conflicts of an internal character.

II.

Factual Background of Events in Rwanda
Before colonization, present-day Rwanda enjoyed a peaceful existence. During

the pre-colonial period, no segregation among Hutus and Tutsis was in place.2 These
groups mostly saw themselves as members of distinct clans, and not as members of
distinct ethnicities.3 This changed upon the arrival of the first European travelers who
began to classify the two clans as distinct “ethnic groups.”4 In 1916, Belgium occupied
Ruanda-Urundi (present-day Rwanda).5 The Tutsi were depended on by the Belgian to
help them rule Rwanda.6
During de-colonization, and under United Nations pressure, the Belgians began to
offer more opportunities to the Hutu.7 The Tutsi elite resented this, and began to push
hard for independence from Belgian rule.8 In 1959, incidents of violence began to break
out between Tutsi and Hutu parties.9 As a result, many Tutsis fled Rwanda into

2

Volume 1A GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION, at 25 (J. Oppenheim & W. van der Wolf eds.,
2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 28. Belgium was mandated to administer Rwanda by the League of Nations and in 1946 Rwanda
became a Belgian trust territory under the United Nations.
6
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4 (1998), at ¶ 82. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 19.] The Belgians felt that the Tutsi were more intelligent and better equipped to rule based on their
looks.
7
Id. at ¶ 86.
8
Id.
9
Id. at ¶ 89.
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neighboring countries. Tutsis regularly conducted incursions into Rwanda in which they
engaged in violence against Hutus.10
In April 1994, while returning from a meeting with other heads of state in order to
discuss the implementation of the peace accords, Rwandan President Habyarimana’s
aircraft was shot down.11 He was killed. This provided for a large-scale unification of
Hutus against the Tutsi, whom the Hutu leaders claimed wanted to reinstate the former
feudal monarchy.12 In April of 1994, Hutu forces began slaughtering Tutsis. This
slaughter continued up until July 1994. The estimated total number of murder victims
resulting from this violence varies from 500,000 to 1,000,000 people.13
During the slaughter, all remnants of law and order broke down. Those entrusted
with the governmental responsibility to maintain law and order, such as Bourgemastres,
Prefects other social elite failed punish or prevent atrocities from occurring in their areas
of control, and sometimes directly participated in these atrocities.

III.

Legal Discussion
Many scholars believe that the doctrine of command responsibility was created

after the Second World War. However, this is not the case. The international community
recognized the principle of command responsibility as early as 1474 with the trial of
Peter Von Hagenbach.14 In the early 1900s, Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, an
American Officer, was tried and convicted at a court-martial for, among other things,
10

Id.
Id. at¶ 106.
12
Id. at ¶ 110.
13
Id. at ¶ 111.
14
William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]
11
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permitting subordinates to commit war crimes.15 Although the doctrine clearly existed
prior to the Second World War, it was the cases brought against military commanders
after the war that refined the doctrine of command responsibility and firmly established
the concept in customary international law.

1. The Yamashita Precedent
In early October 1944, Japanese leadership appointed General Tomoyuki
Yamashita as commanding officer of the Fourteenth Area Army then occupying the
Philippines.16 In preparation of an impending American attack, Yamashita ordered the
withdrawal of his troops from Manila.17 Despite large-scale troop withdrawals from
Manila, some small residual army elements remained in the city, composed mostly of
Japanese naval soldiers, not under the direct command of Yamashita.18

Yamashita

retreated to the mountains, a move, which severely hampered his communication with
battle groups under his command.
While Yamashita waited in the mountains for his inevitable defeat and capture,
Japanese troops remaining in Manila committed widespread atrocities against the
Philippine civilian population. As a result, over thirty-two thousand Philippine civilians
were killed.19 Japanese troops committed acts of torture, including the burning of feet

15

Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary
Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 170 (2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
30.]
16
RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT, 7 (Scholary Resources, Inc. 1982). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]
17
A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA, 153 (The University of Chicago Press 1949).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21.] A. Frank Reel served as Defense Counsel for General
Yamashita during his trials before the American Military Commission in Manila and the Supreme Court.
His work provides a rare and excellent incite into the Yamashita trials.
18
Lael, supra note 24, at 25.
19
Id. at 83.
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and the removal of fingers.20

The Japanese troops also engaged in an episode of

widespread rape, in which Japanese soldiers imprisoned 476 Philippine women in two
Manila hotels and repeatedly raped those women over an eight-day period.21
Upon his capture by American forces, an American Military Tribunal put
Yamashita on trial for the atrocities committed by Japanese troops under his formal
command.

It was charged that Yamashita “unlawfully disregarded and failed to

discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities…against people of the United States and of
its allies and dependencies.”22 The American military was trying Yamashita not for
crimes committed by him, but for crimes committed by his troops. This was a fairly
novel charge and can be seen as the genesis of the modern doctrine of command
responsibility.
Yamashita’s defense team argued that he faced a chaotic situation when he
assumed command of the Philippines. His Army was running short of supplies, the
Americans were approaching, and Yamashita had no time to do anything but prepare a
military strategy. The defense stated, “Can it seriously be contended that a commander,
beset and harassed by the enemy…in the period of a handful of weeks gather in all the
strings of administration?”23 The defense painted a picture of a General who had in the
past subjected his subordinates to punishment for the mistreatment of Philippine citizens
and a General who promoted cooperation between his troops and the civilian

20

Id.
Id. at 84.
22
Charge against General Yamashita before the Military Commission Convened by the Commanding
General United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, reprinted in Lael, supra note 16, at 80. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]
23
Reel, supra note 17, at 155.
21

6

population.24 The prosecution on the other hand, painted a picture of a General who
disregarded his duties to maintain peace and ensure the dignity of the inhabitants of his
occupied territory, despite acknowledging that practically all the atrocities committed by
Japanese troops occurred while communication on such matters was almost impossible.25
On the anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the American Military
Commission sentenced General Yamashita to death by hanging. The Commission stated,
“Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad authority and
heavy responsibility.”26 The Commission called the notion that a commander could be
considered a rapist or murderer because one of his soldiers commits a murder or rape
absurd.27 However, the Commission stated:
“Nonetheless, where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are
widespread offenses and there is no effective attempt by a commander to
discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held
responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops…”28
Therefore, despite the fact that the prosecution could not prove that Yamashita
actually knew of any of the atrocities committed by his troops, the military commission
found that Yamashita’s guilt was indicated by the widespread nature of the offenses.29
The committee found that “the crimes were so extensive and widespread…that they must
either have been willfully permitted by the accused, or secretly ordered by the accused.”30
Upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Yamashita argued that he did not
directly commit any atrocities against the Philippine population and that he, therefore,

24

Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 160.
26
Id. at 171.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Major Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now,
149 MIL. L. REV. 293, 296 (1995). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
30
Id.
25

7

could not be tried for these crimes.31 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating, “the conduct
of military operations by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts
of their commander…result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to
prevent.”32 The Supreme Court found support for this proposition in the Annex to Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land and Article
19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, relating to bombardment by naval vessels. The
Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 states that in order for an armed force to
be accorded the status of lawful belligerents, it must be “commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates.”33

Indeed, “one of the command responsibilities

designated by the Hague Convention IV is insuring “public order and safety” in areas
occupied by military troops.”34 Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention provides that
commanders of belligerent vessels “must see that the above Articles are properly carried
out.”35
The precedent that the Yamashita case stands for has been the subject of much
debate among legal scholars. Some argue that Yamashita was found guilty under a
theory of absolute liability. To support this, they argue that because the evidence of
Yamashita’s knowledge of atrocities committed by his troops was so weak, the

31

Application of Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 7.]
32
Id. at 15
33
Annex to the Convention, Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
October 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
34
Anne B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici Decision of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 N.C.J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 167, 177
(1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
35
Tenth Hague Convention of 1907, Relating to the Bombardment of Naval Vessels, July 6, 1906, art. 19,
36 Stat. 2389. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
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commission accepted his claim of ignorance and found him guilty anyway.36 Opponents
of this view cite to a number of passages in the commission’s decision, which suggest
that the members of the commission simply did not believe Yamashita’s claims of
ignorance.37
In any event, it is apparent that Yamashita stands for the principle that a military
commander has a broad and heavy responsibility to maintain peace and order in his or her
area of control. In the case of Yamashita, Japanese naval soldiers, not formally under his
command, committed many of the alleged atrocities against the Philippine population.
This fact was irrelevant to the Commission. From Yamashita, it can, therefore, be
concluded that the duty of a military commander to maintain peace and order and protect
the inhabitants of an occupied territory is paramount and that the responsibility of a
military commander can be extended to those not formally under his or her control.
2. The High Command Case
In 1947, fourteen high-ranking German officials were tried for waging an
aggressive war and for the ill treatment and murder of thousands of civilians.38 Wilhelm
von Leeb was among the accused. Von Leeb was accused of implementing an illegal
order given by Hitler for German troops to execute Bolshevist Commissars and the
Communist Intelligencia upon capture.39
In his defense, von Leeb asserted that he could not be held responsible for the
atrocities committed in his jurisdiction, because they were committed by “agencies of the
state with which he was not connected and over whom he exercised no supervision or
36

Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The Chances for Successful
Prosecution, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 205 (1994). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
37
Id. at 206.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 210.
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control.”40 The prosecution argued that a military commander of an occupied territory is
per se responsible for atrocities committed in his area of control, “regardless of the fact
that the crimes committed therein were due to the action of the state or superior military
authorities which he did not initiate or in which he did not participate.”41
In response to these arguments, the tribunal felt that the prosecution’s argument
concerning the duties of an occupying general was most persuasive. Regarding a military
commander of an occupying army, the tribunal stated, “It is the opinion of this tribunal
that…under international law and accepted usages of civilized nations that he has certain
responsibilities which he cannot set aside or ignore by reason of activities of his own
state within his area.”42 The tribunal continued, stating in its judgment of von Leeb that a
military commander is “the instrument by which the occupancy exists,” and that it is “his
army which holds the area in subjection.”43 From these facts, the court concluded that it
couldn’t be argued that a military commander “exercises the power by which a civilian
population is subject to…while at the same time the state which he represents may come
into the area which he holds and subject the population to murder…and other inhumane
treatments.”44 Clearly, the court in von Leeb stood for the proposition that a military
commander of an occupying army has the affirmative duty to prevent atrocities
committed by the state which he represents, or face criminal liability for failure to do so.
Notwithstanding this, Wilhelm von Leeb was ultimately found not guilty of
atrocities committed by his army under the doctrine of command responsibility. Several
40

United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb [hereinafter the High Command case], 1948, reprinted in Volume XI
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, 542 (United States
Government Printing Office 1950). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
41
Id. at 544.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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factors contributed to this finding. First, von Leeb had voiced his opinion that this order
was illegal, and upon hearing of these actions being perpetrated by his troops, he took
corrective measures to prevent them in future engagements.45 In dicta, the tribunal
addressed the standard, which should be used in determining command responsibility. In
doing so, the court moved away from the standard set forth in Yamashita. The tribunal
asserted that commanders could only be found responsible where the acts of subordinates
were “traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates
constitutes criminal negligence on his part.”46 The tribunal also asserted that the neglect
must be personal and constitute immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates.47
The tribunal rejected a strict liability or “should have known” standard and instead
required acquiescence.48 The prosecution had not proven that von Leeb was aware of the
sum of the atrocities committed in his area of control.
Although the tribunal in von Leeb seemed to narrow the circumstances in which
military commanders could be held liable for actions of their subordinates to instances in
which they had actual knowledge of the atrocities, it also expanded the duties of
commanders. They could no longer claim that they are not responsible for preventing
atrocities committed in their zone of control by the state, which they represent.
3. The Hostage Case
In marked contrast to the language of the High Command Case, the language
contained in the tribunal’s decision in the Hostage Case seemed to clearly move the
international community toward a “known or should have known” standard with respect

45

Crowe, supra note 36, at 213. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
Id. at 214.
47
Id.
48
Id.
46
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to command responsibility and asserted the proposition that a commander has a broad
responsibility to ensure that the Geneva Conventions are complied with in his or her
occupied territory.
During the Second World War, it was the practice of the German Army to take
civilian hostages of occupied territories to insure against attacks against German troops
by those civilian populations.49 The Southeast Army was ordered to execute fifty to one
hundred civilian hostages for every German soldier killed or captured by civilian militia
forces.50 Accordingly, hundreds of thousands of civilians of Albania, Norway,
Yugoslavia, and Greece were enslaved or murdered during the occupation of the
Southeast German Army in these territories.51
A U.S. Military Tribunal prosecuted German Field Marshal Wilhem List for these
war crimes in the Hostage Case.

Like Yamashita and von Leeb before him, List

contended that he was ignorant of the murder of civilians in the territories occupied by
his troops.52 However, in the town of Topola more than 2,000 villagers suspected of
being Jews or communists were executed at once in retaliation for twenty-two German
soldiers being killed.53 There was evidence to suggest that List was made aware of the
killings and that he failed to take any measures to discipline those responsible or to
ensure that future crimes of this nature would not be committed.54
Ultimately, the tribunal rejected List’s claims of ignorance and stated that a
military commander “is charged with notice of occurrences taking place within that

49

Id. at 216.
Hostage case, supra note 1 at 1233. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
51
Crowe, supra note 36, at 216
52
Id. at 218.
53
Id.
54
Id.
50
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territory…if he fails to require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of duty
rests upon him and he is in no position to plead his own dereliction as a defense.”55 In
other words, the tribunal held that a commander has an affirmative duty to gain
knowledge of actions of his troops in an occupied territory. If a commander fails in this
duty, liability can ensue and a commander will be unable to plead ignorance of the
actions of his troops.
List also claimed that the military units, which committed the atrocities against
Greek and Yugoslavian populations were not under his direct command, and were in fact
under the command of other officials in the German military hierarchy.56 In response to
this claim, the court answered that “the commanding general of an occupied territory,
having executive authority as well as military command, will not be heard to say that a
unit taking unlawful orders from someone other than himself was responsible for the
crime and that he is thereby absolved from responsibility.”57 This is an early recognition
of the principle of indirect subordination; the notion that a military commander can be
held responsible for actions of those not under his direct command because it is the duty
of a military commander to maintain peace and order in an area occupied by his or her
army.
Expounding on the notion of indirect subordination, the tribunal made it clear that
subordination is a non-issue when the responsibilities of a commanding general have not
been met. It stated “as to the commanding general of occupied territory who is charged
with maintaining peace and order, punishing crime and protecting lives and property,
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issues of subordination are relatively unimportant.”58 The court enunciated that the
duties of a commanding general in occupied territory are not limited to supervision of
troops or military units under his or her control. On the contrary, the Tribunal in List
clearly felt that the duties of a military commander in an occupied territory are duties of a
general policing nature to control the actions of military and civilians alike.
In order to support this notion, the tribunal delineated the legal obligations, which
a military commander has when commanding an occupying army. The tribunal stated
that it is the “duty of the commanding general in occupied territory to maintain peace and
order, punish crime and protect lives and property. This duty extends not only to the
inhabitants of the occupied territory but to his own troops and auxiliaries as well.”59 The
tribunal further stated, “The duty and responsibility for maintaining peace and order, and
the prevention of crime rests upon the commanding general.”60 In the accomplishment of
these purposes, the tribunal felt that it is implied that it is the duty of a commanding
general of an occupied territory to control the actions of the inhabitants as well as to
control the actions of “other lawless persons or groups.”61
Because the tribunal saw it as the primary duty of a commanding general in an
occupied territory to control the actions of the inhabitants as well as his military troops
and “other lawless groups,” it can be inferred that a commanding general does have an
affirmative duty to protect civilians from attacks by other civilians and that his or her
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failure to do so should result in criminal liability under the doctrine command
responsibility.62
B.

Codification of Doctrines of Command and Superior Responsibility

This paper argues that military commanders can be held criminally liable for war
crimes committed by civilians and states within their area of control. When analyzed, the
following international statutory provisions help to support this conclusion.
1.

Article 86 of Additional Protocol I
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court in Yamashita argued that the principle of

command responsibility could be derived from certain provisions of the Hague
Conventions. However, the notion of command responsibility and superior responsibility
were explicitly codified in the “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949.” In pertinent part, Article 86 (entitled “Failure to Act”) of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions reads:
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or
disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had
information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their
power to prevent or repress the breach.63
62
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Article 86 makes no mention of “military commanders.” Rather, it states that any
person who may be considered a “superior” will be held responsible for the criminal
actions of subordinates.” This implies that Article 86 applies exclusively to civilians.
This is further supported by the fact that Article 87 of Protocol I, entitled “Duty of
Commanders,” explicitly addresses the traditional notion of command responsibility as it
applies in a military context.64
2. Article 87 of Additional Protocol I
In pertinent part, Article 87 of Additional Protocol I provides:
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his
control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the
Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to
prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof.65
Article 87 of Additional Protocol I clearly stands for the notion that military
commanders can be, and should be, held responsible for the actions of people other than
“subordinates” under their control. In passing Article 87 as part of Additional Protocol I,
the international community clearly has recognized the principle that military
commanders have responsibilities in their occupied zones, which extend far beyond
control of their own troops. Indeed, as the Tribunal explained in the High Command
Case, and Hostage Case, commanders are under a duty to keep the peace in their areas of
control. This responsibility must extend to control over troops, civilians, and other
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groups within a commander’s control in order to ensure that the laws of war are complied
with to the fullest level.

C.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

1.

Article 7 of the ICTY Statute
Security Council Resolution 808 created the International Criminal Tribunal for

the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in order to create a body with the jurisdiction to
prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.66 Article 7 of the ICTY
Statute, with regard to the crimes outlined in Articles 2 and 5 of the statute states:
3. The fact that any of the acts… was committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.67
This language is almost identical to that of Article 86 of Additional Protocol I.
Therefore, the statute creates criminal liability based on the theory of “superiorsubordinate” responsibility. Article 7 of the ICTY Statute most closely resembles Article
86 of Additional Protocol I, making no mention of military commanders. However, as
we will see from ICTY case law, military commanders are included under the ambit of
Article 7 of the statute. The following section will examine the prosecution of Zejnil
Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, and Hazim Delic by the ICTY in the Celebici Case.
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2.

The Celebici Decision
In 1992, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces took control of certain

villages within the municipality of Konjic, located in central Bosnia and Herzegovina.68
In Konjic, members of the local civilian population were detained in the Celebici camp,
operated by the former Yugoslav People’s Army or (“JNA”).69 The ICTY found that the
detainees being held in the Celebici camp were subjected to cruel and inhumane
treatment, including beatings, murders, sexually assault, and torture.70
The relation of each of the accused to the Celebici camp was unique. Mucic was
the commander of the Celebici Camp.71 Delic was the deputy commander of the camp.72
Delalic’s connection to the camp was more removed. Delalic served, in various forms, as
the coordinator of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces in the Konjic area during
the time of the operation of the camp.
Before discussing the criminal liability of each defendant, the tribunal first
examined the doctrines of command and superior responsibility. First, the tribunal stated
that the fact that military commanders and other persons occupying positions of superior
authority may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful actions of their
subordinates is a well-established “norm of customary and conventional international
law.”73 The court then addressed Article 7(3) of the ICTY statute. The court agreed with
the prosecution that the finding of liability according to the doctrine of superior
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responsibility rested on three necessary elements, derived from Article 7(3).74 The three
part test lists the following elements as the essential elements of command responsibility:
(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, (ii) the superior knew or had
reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed and (iii) the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act
or punish the perpetrator thereof.75
The court then proceeded to address the nature of the requisite superiorsubordinate relationship needed to find liability under Article 7(3). The prosecution
argued “that the essential requirement of the doctrine of command responsibility is proof
of the superior’s control over his subordinates and his ability to prevent them from
committing violations or punish them for such violations.”76 The prosecution’s argument
rested on the assumption that the application of the command responsibility doctrine does
not depend on an officially designated rank, or de jure (formal) authority, but also arises
from de facto (informal) command or control.77 The prosecution also argued that the
type of control needed for the doctrine of command responsibility to apply to a given
situation can vary, taking on forms including operational control, tactical control,
administrative control, and executive control in territories.78 “By including those who
exercised de facto control over the Celebici camp, which allows even informal
commanders to fall within the doctrine, the prosecution desired an expanded definition of
“superior.”79
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The defense countered the prosecution’s argument, contending that the
application of command responsibility to a particular situation depends upon the de jure
authority of the commander.80 In other words, the defense argued that in order to find
liability under the doctrine of command or superior responsibility, an accused must have
the lawful authority to issue binding orders in his or her name.81
In its findings, the tribunal found the prosecution’s argument to be more
persuasive. Hence, the tribunal stated, “the Trial Chamber accepts the Prosecution’s
proposition that individuals in positions of authority, whether civilian or within military
structures, may incur criminal responsibility under the doctrine of command
responsibility on the basis of their de facto as well as their de jure positions as
superiors.”82 Acknowledging that commanders or superiors alike can be held liable for
failure to act in accordance with their de facto power, the tribunal then turned its attention
to the nature of the superior-subordinate relationship.
In analyzing prior case law, the ICTY felt that a position of command of
subordinates is a necessary pre-requisite to a finding of command responsibility.83
However, in accordance with the prosecution’s argument, the tribunal conceded that this
position of command could not be determined by a classic rank structure alone, but by an
analysis of the commander/superior’s “actual possession, or non-possession of powers of
control over the actions of subordinates.”84 Therefore, the tribunal voiced its opinion that
a superior-subordinate relationship depends more on the power to control the actions of
“subordinates” than on formal rank or military structure. This view is in keeping with
80
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Article 87 of Additional Protocol I (outlined above), which establishes the duty of a
military commander to prevent the commission of violations of the Geneva Conventions
by his troops, but also by “other persons not under his control.”
To shed light on this notion, the tribunal analogized its position to the notion of
“indirect subordination.” For an example of indirect subordination, the tribunal quoted
relevant language from the Commentary to the Additional Protocols. This language
provides that:
If the civilian population in its own territory is hostile to prisoners of war
and threatens them with ill-treatment, the military commander who is
responsible for these prisoners has an obligation to intervene and to take
the necessary measures, even though this population is not officially under
his authority.85
In likening its position to that of the Commentary to Protocol I, the ICTY directly
acknowledged that a commander could be held responsible for atrocities committed by
persons not directly under his or her control. The tribunal noted “[a] survey of the
existing judicial precedents demonstrates that commanders in regular armed forces have,
on occasion, been held criminally responsible for their failure to prevent or punish
criminal acts committed by persons not formally under their authority in the chain of
command.”86 The tribunal explicitly recognized the rules of law set down by the High
Command Case and the Hostage Case that commanders of an occupied area “may be
held responsible for war crimes committed against civilians and prisoners of war in that
area by troops not under their command.”87 88
85
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(i)

The Prosecution of Hazim Delic
After a careful examination of the evidence, the tribunal concluded that Delic

could not be held liable through superior responsibility because the prosecution had failed
to show that he was in fact a superior with the power to punish acts of his subordinates or
with the power to prevent acts of his subordinates.89
With regard to Delic’s superior responsibility, the defense argued that Delic could
not be held liable for superior responsibility unless it was shown that he was in a position
of command.90 More specifically, the defense argued Delic was merely acting as a
conduit to transfer orders from the commander to individuals of lower rank than himself
and that consequently, Delic lacked any true superior responsibility.91
In its analysis, the ICTY tribunal rejected this argument and proceeded under the
“de facto” command doctrine and focused on whether the prosecution had met its burden
of proving that Delic exercised command authority (de jure or de facto) over prison
guards at Celebici.92 The tribunal ultimately ruled that the prosecution’s evidence, which
consisted of eyewitness testimony that Delic appeared to be in charge of the prison
guards and that Delic gave orders and exercised influence over the prison guards was
inadequate to prove superior responsibility.93
(ii)

The Prosecution of Zdravko Mucic
Unlike Delic, Mucic was alleged to have been the actual commander of the

Celebici prison camp.94 In evaluating Mucic’s case, the tribunal again stressed that the
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essence of command or superior responsibility is the actual exercise of authority.
Ultimately, from a lengthy analysis of the evidence, the tribunal found that Mucic did
indeed have de facto command authority at the Celebici camp.95 Upon an evaluation of
Mucic’s knowledge of the incidents, the tribunal imputed knowledge to Mucic because of
the widespread nature of the atrocities committed at Celebici.96
(iii)

Prosecution of Zejnil Delalic
The ICTY found that Delalic could not be held responsible for the atrocities

committed at Celebici. The tribunal’s analysis begins by stating, “The view of the
Prosecution that a person may, in the absence of a subordinate unit through which the
authority is exercised, incur responsibility for the exercise of superior authority seems to
the Trial Chamber a novel proposition clearly at variance with the principle of command
responsibility.”97 The tribunal stated this, despite having acknowledged previously in the
Judgment that military commanders can be, and have been held responsible for atrocities
committed by persons not under their formal command.
The tribunal then reiterates its support for the doctrine of de facto or actual
authority, while stating at the same time, “The Trial Chamber is unable to agree with the
submission of the Prosecution that a chain of command is not a necessary requirement in
the exercise of superior authority.”98 The tribunal seemed unable to reconcile the notions
of de facto and de jure authority. A formal chain of command is not a necessary requisite
for the finding of de facto authority. According to previous judicial precedent, and the
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Trial Chamber’s own statements in previous portions of the Celebici judgment, de facto
authority is based on a finding of actual authority, not a formal chain of command.
The ICTY’s decision became clearer when it directly addressed the fact that
Delalic merely acted as Commander of Tactical Group 1, and not as a commander of a
“geographical area.”99 The tribunal’s assertion that commanders of tactical military units
are not in command of a geographical region and, therefore, are not subject to criminal
liability resulting from atrocities committed in the area by persons other than their
subordinate troops is consistent with previous international jurisprudence.100

In

distinguishing between tactical and regional commanders, the ICTY acknowledges that
regional commanders may be held liable for atrocities committed in their area of control
by persons other than their troops.101
(iv)

The Appeal
The Appeals Chamber’s decision on Mucic’s appeal from the Trial Chambers

finding of guilt based on command responsibility provides a consistent and clear analysis
of the doctrines of command and superior responsibility.
In its analysis, the Appeals Chamber began by citing Article 87(3) of Additional
Protocol I. The Chamber recognized that Article 87(3) requires a commander who is
“aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have
committed a breach of the Conventions” is under a duty to prevent or punish such acts.102
The Chamber then cites the Blaskic case, stating that “Additional Protocol I construed
99
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control in terms of the material ability of a commander to punish” perpetrators of war
crimes.103 The Chamber thus clearly asserts that under Additional Protocol I and Article
7(3) of the ICTY Statute that, “a commander or superior is thus the one who possesses
the power or authority in either a de jure or de facto form to prevent a subordinate’s
crime or to punish the perpetrators of the crime after the crime is committed.”104
In contrast to the Trial Chamber’s decision in Celebici, the Appeals Chamber
makes no mention of formal rank or command structure. Instead, the analysis clearly
focuses on actual or formal power to punish or prevent the commission of war crimes.
The Chamber proclaimed:
In many contemporary conflicts, there may be only de facto, selfproclaimed governments and therefore de facto armies and paramilitary
groups subordinate thereto. Command structure, organized hastily, may
well be in disorder and primitive. To enforce the law in these
circumstances requires a determination of accountability not only of
individual offenders but also of their commanders or other superiors who
were, based on evidence, in control of them, without, however, a formal
commission or appointment.105
To establish a clear standard for use in command and superior responsibility
cases, the Appeals Chamber reiterates the notion of “effective control,” which it stated
has been accepted as a standard to be used to determine superior and command
responsibility.106 Thus in determining questions of liability, the Chamber felt it was
necessary to look to the effective exercise of control or power and not to formal rank or
formal title within a chain of command.107
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The jurisprudence of the ICTY complies with the notions of command
responsibility set forth in the post-WWII jurisprudence. It also is in accordance with
Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I. Although the ICTY (even the Appeals
Chamber), seems more concerned with a “formal” chain of command, its recognition that
a military commander can be and has been found liable for actions of persons other than
those under his command preserves the notion that military commanders of an occupying
army, as general peacekeepers, are obliged to punish those responsible for war crimes
and to prevent war crimes from occurring in their area of control.

IV.

Imposing Individual Criminal Liability for Command and Superior
Responsibility in Internal Armed Conflicts
Although the notions of command responsibility and superior responsibility are

firmly rooted in international law, there is some question as to their applicability to armed
conflicts of an internal character, i.e. civil wars. Additional Protocol I, examined above,
as an annex to the original Geneva Conventions of 1949, clearly applies only to
international armed conflicts.

The only provision of the Geneva Conventions that

directly applies to internal conflicts is Common Article 3, and its supplement, Additional
Protocol II. Neither of these instruments provides for individual criminal liability, under
the doctrine of superior responsibility.108
The ICTY addressed this question in Prosecutor v. Tadic. In Tadic, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that criminal liability attaches to breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, “regardless of whether they are committed in internal or international
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conflicts.”109

The Chamber also stated that according to conventions of treaty

interpretation set down by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the finding
of individual criminal responsibility is not precluded by an absence of treaty provisions
explicitly providing for criminal responsibility.110
The ICTY Appeals Chamber addressed this question again in its Celebici
decision. Following its decision in Tadic, the Appeals Chamber upheld its ruling that
individual criminal liability can be imposed under Common Article 3, even though no
provision outlining individual liability is present in Common Article 3. “The fact that
Common Article 3 does not contain an explicit reference to individual criminal liability
does not necessarily bear the consequence that there is no possibility to sanction
criminally a violation of this rule.”111
In further interpreting the Geneva Conventions, the Appeals Chamber in Celebici
felt that the provisions of Common Article 3 were clearly intended to be criminalized.112
This refutes much commentary by scholars asserting that penal sanctions were intended
to reach international conflicts only.113 The conclusion of the Appeals Chamber makes
sense. International law, created by treaties would be without force if enforcement
provisions were not provided for. Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions imposes
upon States the affirmative duty to implement the provisions of Common Article 3 in
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their respective domestic legislation.114 This duty included the duty to implement the
provisions of Common Article 3 and directly reinforces the notion that criminal liability
is implied for breaches of Common Article 3.
International law expert Michael P. Scharf supports the contention of the ICTY
Appeals chamber that individual criminal liability applies to internal armed conflicts.115
Scharf writes, “there now exists substantial support for the principle of individual
criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law applicable to
internal armed conflicts as a matter of customary international law.”116 Scharf, citing
reaffirmations by the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and the Commission on
Human Rights asserts, “the international community has affirmed the principle of
individual criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law
applicable to internal armed conflicts as a matter of customary international law.”117
Therefore, with the adoption of Common Article 3 and Protocol II, combatants
engaged in internal conflicts within nation states are bound to respect the basic standards
of humanity.118 The provisions of these instruments are meant to protect combatants and
non-combatants alike in internal conflicts from war crimes and other atrocities. Indeed,
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are subject to mandatory universal
jurisdiction, whether they are committed during international or internal armed
conflicts.119

Driving this idea home, the Appeals Chamber in its Celebici decision
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recognized that most conflicts in the world today are internal in nature, and that a lack of
power to punish war crimes committed in these internal conflicts would go against the
main purpose of the Geneva Conventions; to protect the rights and dignity of all
people.120 The doctrines of command responsibility and superior responsibility insofar as
they provide for individual criminal liability, are directly applicable to internal conflicts
under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.

V.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
This section analyzes case law concerning command and superior responsibility

with an analysis of the jurisprudence on these subjects created by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Specifically, an analysis of three cases will follow:
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed
Ruzindana, and finally Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema.
In order to punish those responsible for atrocities committed in Rwanda from
April to July of 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was
created pursuant to Security Council of the United Nations Resolution 955 of November
8, 1994.121 Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute imposes criminal liability on “superiors” for
war crimes committed by their subordinates. Indeed, the language of Article 6(3) of the
ICTR Statute is identical to the language of Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute.122
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A.

Jean Paul Akeyasu
Jean Paul Akeyasu (“Akeyasu”) served as Bourgmestre of the Taba commune in

Rwanda from April 1993 to June 1994, the period in which the violence committed by
Hutu militia groups against Tutsis was at its peak.123 It is estimated that, during this time,
between 2,000 and 7,000 Tutsis were slaughtered in Taba.
The Prosecution indicted Akayesu on counts of multiple war crimes, including
genocide, complicity in genocide, and other crimes against humanity including rape and
torture.124 Akayesu was charged under the doctrine of superior responsibility (Article
6(3) of ICTR Statute) for counts 13 through 15, including rape, inhumane acts, and
outrages upon personal dignity.125 It was the theory of the Prosecution that Akayesu had
the de facto authority to prevent or punish the perpetrators of the atrocities committed
within Taba, and that his failure to do so resulted in criminal liability under Article 6(3)
of the statute.126 Before applying Article 6(3) to Akayesu, the tribunal briefly addressed
the doctrines of command and superior responsibility.
From the outset, it was apparent that the ICTR was cautious and reluctant to find
criminal liability based on the doctrine of superior responsibility. The Chamber engaged
in a brief analysis of superior responsibility, and concluded from the trial of Former
Minister of Japan Hirota that, “the application of the principle of individual criminal
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responsibility to civilians remains contentious.”127 The Chamber acknowledged that in
determining whether an accused had the power to take all necessary measures to prevent
or punish war crimes should be a case-by-case determination.128
The ICTR, in one paragraph, decided whether Akayesu could be found criminally
liable for counts 13-15 of the indictment under the doctrine of superior responsibility. It
stated, “Although the evidence supports a finding that superior/subordinate relationship
existed… the Tribunal notes that there is no allegation in the Indictment that the… armed
local militia, were subordinates of the accused.”129

The Chamber did not address

Akayesu’s apparent de facto power to prevent atrocities and punish those committing
atrocities in Taba. It is a power that Akayesu possessed by nature of his authority as the
Bourgemastre and failed to use. Indeed, the duties of a Bourgmestre are diverse, and
Akeyasu was basically in charge of the “total life of the commune in terms of the
economy, infrastructure, markets, medical care and the overall social life.”130

The

position of the Bourgmestre could be likened to the representative of the President of
Rwanda within the commune.131 Basically, the Bourgmestre can be seen as the executive
authority within the commune, with responsibility to make sure that the laws are enforced
and executed, representing the “communal authority.”132
B.

Clement Kayishema
The ICTR substantially clarified its position concerning the application of

superior responsibility in the case of Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana.
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It is

important to note that the decision in Kayishema immediately followed the ICTY’s
decision in Celebici.
Dr. Kayishema was the Prefect of the Kibuye prefecture in the territory of
Rwanda.133 As such, he was the governmental executive authority in Kibuye, one of
eleven prefectures existing in the Republic of Rwanda in 1994. Kayishema’s alleged
crimes included genocide. Specifically, it was alleged by the Prosecutor that Kayishema
ordered and participated in four massacres, in which Tutsis were rounded up and
slaughtered by Hutu militia groups.134

Seeking criminal liability based on superior

responsibility, the Prosecution charged, with respect to each massacre, that Kayishema
“did not take measures to prevent an attack, and after the attack Clement Kayishema did
not punish the perpetrators.”135
In its analysis of superior responsibility, the ICTR Trial Chamber relied heavily
on the principles set forth in the ICTY’s decision in Celebici. Indeed, the ICTR in
Kayishema reaffirmed the ICTY’s analysis of superior responsibility. In doing so, the
Chamber recognized that superior responsibility “is ultimately predicated upon the power
of the superior to control the acts of his subordinates.”136 The Chamber explicitly aligned
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itself with the decision of the ICTY in Celebici, and with the decisions in the High
Command Case and Hostage Case, reasserting the principle that “influential powers not
amounting to formal powers of command ‘provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of
command responsibility.’”137 In reaffirming these principles, the ICTR recognized that
formal rank and command structure are unnecessary in finding liability under command
and superior responsibility. Although the Chamber stated that the superior-subordinate
relationship is central to a finding of liability under command responsibility, it also
acknowledged that this relationship is predicated on the actual power, be it informal or
formal, to influence or punish conduct.
In applying these principles to Kayishema’s case, the Chamber found that it was
indisputable that Kayishema, as Prefect of Kibuye, exercised de jure control over the
perpetrators of the massacres.138 Noting that the finding of de jure authority does not
automatically impute liability through command responsibility, the Chamber then
addressed Kayishema’s de facto authority. The Chamber stated, “Thus, no legal or
formal position of authority need exist between the accused and the perpetrators of the
crimes.”139 The Chamber was ultimately satisfied that the prosecution had established
the de facto authority of Kayishema and that he knew or had reason to know of the war
crimes and failed to prevent them. Kayishema was accordingly found criminally liable
under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute.
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C.

Alfred Musema
During the explosion of violence in Rwanda in 1994, Alfred Musema was the

Director of the Gisovu Tea Factory in the Kibuye Prefecture.140 The Prosecution alleged
that Musema was guilty of crimes including genocide and other crimes against humanity
both for directly committing these crimes and for failure to prevent subordinates from
committing these crimes.141
In assessing Musema’s liability under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, the Trial
Chamber noted that the “superior-subordinate command relationship often appears in the
form of psychological pressure.”142 The Chamber reasserted its support for the doctrine
of de facto command and also explicitly recognized the notion of indirect subordination.
The Chamber noted that “power of control, even if it is merely de facto, generally implies
indirect subordination, which…extends beyond the commander’s duty to his direct
subordinates to ‘other persons under his responsibility,’ to prevent violations of the
Geneva Conventions.”143
The Chamber found that the prosecution had established that employees of the
Gisovu Tea Factory were among the perpetrators of the war crimes Musema was charged
with.144

It also found that Musema, as their employer, was the superior of these

perpetrators, holding de jure and de facto power over them.145 Finally, the Chamber
found that Musema knew of the atrocities committed by his employees or
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subordinates.146 Consequently Alfred Musema was found guilty of genocide and other
crimes against humanity based on his superior responsibility for the actions of his
employees.

VI.

Final Analysis
After reviewing the case law, including post-WWII jurisprudence and the

jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, a final analysis of the sum of this jurisprudence is
necessary in order to explain how this law supports the thesis of this memorandum; that
military commanders, as part of their duty in ensuring that the Geneva Conventions are
complied with (whether the conflict involved is international or internal), are responsible
for actions of persons under their effective control including persons other than their
troops.
The sum of the post-WWII jurisprudence, from Yamashita to the Hostage Case,
clearly impose upon military commanders broad duties in maintaining peace and order in
their respective areas of control. In the case of General Yamashita, the Commission
trying him acknowledged that Japanese naval troops, not under the direct command of
Yamashita, committed most of the atrocities in Manila.147 Yet, Yamashita was held
responsible by the Commission, which asserted the proposition that, with command of
military troops, comes broad and heavy responsibilities.148
It was acknowledged in the cases against German Field Marshalls Wilhelm von
Leeb and Wilhelm List that these broad responsibilities include a duty to prevent or
punish crimes committed in a military commander’s area of control even if these actions
146
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were committed or are going to be committed by persons not under the commander’s
direct command.149 The tribunal in the High Command case specifically asserted that a
military commander must prevent a state or other lawless groups from committing crimes
in an occupied area because it is the “power of the commander’s occupying army, which
holds the area in subjection.” In similar fashion, the American Military Tribunal in the
Hostage Case imputed to military commanders the duty of maintaining the peace and
order within an occupied area and extended this duty to controlling the actions of military
and civilians alike.
The ideas espoused in the post-WWII cases were explicitly codified for the first
time in Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I. Article 87 explicitly requires that
military commanders prevent or punish war crimes committed by subordinates or “other
persons under his control.”150 “Other persons” in this context must be read to include
civilians, or other lawless groups committing crimes within a military commander’s area
of control. Indeed, a military commander occupying a territory is an executive authority
with the duty to maintain law and order. With this duty, comes the power to punish,
including the responsibility to punish perpetrators of war crimes. This is the logic on
which Article 87 is predicated. This notion is supported by the Commentary to the
Additional Protocols, which states that if a civilian population threatens the well-being of
prisoners of war, it is the duty of a military commander to prevent or punish the actions
of the civilians. It would be consistent to deduce from this that a military commander
also has the affirmative duty to protect civilians from other civilians.
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Many international law commentators support this point. Ilias Bantekas, writing
for the American Journal of International Law states, “[E]xecutive commanders…are
accountable within the territory they occupy to assure that the rights of civilians and
POWs therein are fully protected. In the case of executive commanders, subordination is
unimportant, their responsibility is co-extensive with their appointed command
structure.”151 Accordingly, military commanders have a duty to prevent and punish
crimes committed by allied forces or auxiliary forces stationed within their area of
control.152 Military commanders must also punish civilians who commit war crimes due
to inter-communal rivalry.153
The jurisprudence created by the ICTY and ICTR concerning superior
responsibility are also consistent with the notion that commanders are responsible for
atrocities committed by persons other than their troops or formal subordinates. At the
center of the ICTY’s decision in the Celebici case is the proposition that a superiorsubordinate relationship is to be judged by not only de jure or formal powers, but by de
facto or actual powers.

The tribunal explicitly recognized the doctrine of indirect

subordination, or the notion that military commanders could be, and have been found
criminally liable for actions of persons other than those under their control. This is
justified because a military commander has the de facto power to punish perpetrators of
crimes within their area of control.
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Similarly, the ICTR has recognized that the superior-subordinate relationship is
based on the actual power, formal or informal, to influence or punish conduct. The ICTR
has acknowledged that legal or formal positions of authority are unnecessary in the
finding of command or superior responsibility. Military commanders certainly have the
power to influence or punish the conduct of civilians within their area of control, and
therefore, can be held criminally liable for their failure to do so.

VII.

Conclusion
The above analysis compels the conclusion that military commanders may be held

criminally liable for war crimes committed by civilians or states in their respective areas
of control if the commander knew or should have known of the atrocities and fails to
prevent or punish the atrocities. Again, it is the power of the commander’s army that
controls an occupied territory. A commander may not allow a state to commit atrocities
and then defend his non-action by claiming he or she had no power to prevent the
atrocities. With regard to civilians, military commanders have de facto authority over
inhabitants of occupied territories. With this authority, comes the ability to punish crimes
committed and influence over civilian action. This implies a duty to prevent war crimes
committed by civilians.
This conclusion is necessary if customary international law is to survive and have
any force in modern conflicts. As the ICTR recognized, most modern conflicts are
internal in character. Armies in these conflicts are largely informal and exist by a de
facto command structure. Those with the de facto power to ensure that the Geneva
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Conventions are complied with, namely, military or superior commanders, must be
threatened with criminal liability for failure to enforce these conventions.
If no criminal liability could be imposed on commanders, victims of war crimes
will be left with no justice.

Common troops will be able to blend back into the

population and victims will not be redressed for their suffering. Commanders and other
higher profile combatants must be punished.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions was implemented by states to
ensure that basic standards of humanity are respected during armed conflict.154 This goal
can only be attained through the threat of penal sanctions imposed by the international
community. “If the international community seriously intends to combat gross human
rights violations it has to do so irrespective of particular states interests in order to attain
the interests of the broader international society.”155 In order to strengthen this interest of
the international community, individual criminal responsibility for violations of
customary international law must be applied uniformly regardless of the nature of the
conflict or the region or state involved.156
International authorities, including international prosecutors should not hesitate to
indict persons (including military commanders) who, while in positions of authority and
with knowledge (be it actual or constructive), negligently fail to punish or prevent
persons who have committed or are about to commit war crimes.
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